2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

18 March 2010

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Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East

Report submitted by Canada

1. At the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, Canada supported a resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (resolution 64/26). In addition, Canada co-sponsored the resolution entitled "Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons" (resolution 64/47) and voted in favour of the resolution entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world" (resolution 64/57). Canada encourages further consultations between the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Member States in the Middle East with a view to convening a forum on the experience of other regions with existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, and on the relevance of this for the Middle East.

2. Canada has called for the universal and full adherence and compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by States in the Middle East. At IAEA, Canada actively supported the adoption of a resolution on the application of safeguards in the Middle East by the General Conferences of the Agency in 2005 and 2006. Canada regrets that it was unable to support that resolution in 2007, 2008 and 2009, given that changes presented by the drafters were not the result of a consensual approach. Canada welcomes the fact that signatory States of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the region have ratified a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA. Canada has appealed to all States in the region to contribute further to regional stability and security by concluding additional protocols to their respective safeguards agreements, thereby demonstrating greater openness and transparency. With regard to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Canada co-sponsored the resolution on that Treaty (resolution 64/69) at the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, and has also encouraged the three Annex 2 signatories in the region (Egypt, Islamic Republic of Iran and Israel) to ratify the Treaty in a coordinated manner as a confidence- and security-building measure. Such a measure was included in the Final Declaration at the September 2009 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty that took place in New York.

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3. Canada shares the serious international concerns about the scope and nature of Iran's past and ongoing nuclear programme. Although Canada recognizes that Iran has a right to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, that right also comes with responsibilities. Canada is deeply disturbed by Iran's decision to further enrich its nuclear material in defiance of Security Council resolutions. These latest moves bring Iran considerably closer to possessing weapons-grade material. Canada also notes with concern that Iran continues to take actions inconsistent with its safeguards obligations, including failure to inform the Agency in a timely manner about construction of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant and proceeding to feed low-enriched uranium into the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant without allowing sufficient time for the Agency to adjust the existing safeguards procedures. Most troubling of all is the assessment in the latest IAEA report that "Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities". We note that Iran has lost the confidence of the Board of Governors of IAEA and the Security Council through its two-decade history of concealing nuclear activities. In the light of this history, as well as Iran's failure to provide any plausible justification for its efforts to acquire the full nuclear fuel cycle, Canada fully supports Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) and the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors of IAEA in November 2009 (GOV/2009/82). Those resolutions clearly state the international community's desire for a negotiated diplomatic solution which respects Iran's right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy while ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. We welcome efforts of the P5+1 in this regard and encourage Iran to engage constructively. Canada also urges Iran to cooperate fully and comply with the international obligations set out by the Security Council, provide "all requested information, clarifications and access" identified by IAEA as deficient, and fully implement the Additional Protocol. Only through cooperation, transparency and renewed implementation of its Additional Protocol can Iran begin to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. We continue to encourage Iran to avail itself of the opportunity to conclude an agreement regarding the supply of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, which would provide an important confidence-building opportunity as well as address humanitarian concerns.

4. Canada remains deeply concerned about findings that point to possible undeclared nuclear material, facilities and activities in the Syrian Arab Republic, and also about possible nuclear cooperation between Syria and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. While we recognize the difficulties that the Agency has faced conducting its investigations in view of the physical circumstances it found at the Dair Alzour site, we also note the very serious potential proliferation threat that would be posed by an undeclared nuclear reactor of the kind that appears to have existed at the site. With this in view, we urge Syria to cooperate immediately and fully with the IAEA investigation by providing all additional information and access as requested by IAEA in order for the Agency to complete its assessment. The finding of particles of anthropogenic nature uranium at both the Dair Alzour and Miniature Neutron Source Reactor sites is another matter of concern. Canada notes that since Syria has no reported inventory of natural uranium, the presence of such particles calls into question the completeness and correctness of Syria's declarations concerning nuclear material and facilities. These are very serious findings and it is

only through full, transparent and proactive cooperation with IAEA that Syria can restore confidence with respect to the scope and nature of its nuclear programme.

5. Canada has called on all remaining States not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to join as non-nuclear-weapon States. As a confidence-building measure in advance of this ultimate goal, Canada has also called on these same States to separate civilian and military fuel cycles and to place all civilian nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. These statements are in conformity with both the policies and actions of the Canadian Government, which include Canada's voting record on the resolutions referred to above in paragraph 1 at the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly. It also conforms with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which requires States to take steps to ensure that non-State actors cannot manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use weapons of mass destruction or their delivery systems. These steps include, inter alia: adopting robust national legislation to prohibit the possession, manufacture or trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, in particular for terrorist purposes; developing appropriate, effective export, trans-shipment and border controls on weapons-of-mass-destruction materials if these do not exist; and maintaining effective physical protection and accountancy of such materials.

6. Canada recognizes the growing interest in nuclear energy among States parties in the Middle East and welcomes the announcements made by a number of such States concerning new initiatives in this field. In welcoming these initiatives, we note that all nuclear power programmes should be accompanied by the strongest commitments to nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safety and nuclear security.

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Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Canada

1. Step 12 of the 13 practical steps agreed to by all Governments at the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons calls for "regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States Parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament', and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996". In line with this commitment, and with a view to enhancing transparency and building confidence, Canada submits the present report on the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty on an article-by-article basis and on the 13 practical steps. Such comprehensive reporting is not intended to expand the scope of the commitments made but is a reflection of the linkages that exist among the articles of the Treaty as well as the 13 practical steps. Canada would like to draw the attention of States parties to the decline in reporting experienced during this review cycle and has included as an annex to the present report the summary of a paper by Project Ploughshares on the Non-Proliferation Treaty reporting during 2002-2009. We encourage States parties to read the full paper and to consider how best to fulfil national reporting commitments in the future.

Article I

2. Canada continues to call upon nuclear-weapon States not to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In this respect, Canada views reductions by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear weapons inventories and the diminishment of the political and military value ascribed to nuclear weapons as playing an important role in discouraging further nuclear weapons proliferation. Nuclear proliferation continues to pose a threat to the world. Canada maintains that members of the United Nations must work together to ensure that Security Council resolutions are fully implemented and that States work together to halt activities that have no reasonable purpose other than the acquisition of nuclear weapons. For our part, Canada has fully implemented Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004), 1718

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(2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1874 (2009). Canada welcomes the unanimous adoption of Security Council resolution 1887 (2009), which clearly reflects the renewed emphasis being placed on strengthening non-proliferation and disarmament efforts by the international community.

3. Canada is a member of the Group of Eight-led Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (hereinafter, Global Partnership), an initiative launched under Canadian leadership at the Group of Eight summit, held in Kananaskis, Canada, in 2002. Leaders committed US$ 20 billion over 10 years to address the threats posed by weapons or materials of mass destruction (including nuclear) and related knowledge. The Global Partnership, with 23 members, is a concrete international cooperative threat reduction mechanism implementing the non-proliferation, disarmament and counter-terrorism goals and objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In 2009-2010 alone, Canada spent over Can$ 23 million securing nuclear and other radiological materials. Canada is an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative, which seeks to enhance practical cooperation to impede and stop shipments of, inter alia, nuclear weapons material and technology flowing illegally to and from States and non-State actors, consistent with national legal authorities and international law. Canada is also an initial partner nation of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and in 2008 Canada hosted a conference on security of radioactive sources, which involved more than 100 participants from over 20 partner States of the Initiative and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Canada is also an active participant in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Group of Eight Non-Proliferation Directors Group. Canada will host the 2010 Group of Eight summit, and has chosen to make non-proliferation and the Review Conference one focus of our Group of Eight presidency.

Article II

4. Canada continues to abide by its NPT commitment not to receive the transfer of, receive control over, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or a nuclear explosive capability. This commitment is implemented domestically primarily through Canada's Nuclear Safety and Control Act of 2000 and the Export and Import Permits Act of 1985.

5. Canada calls on other non-nuclear-weapon States not to receive the transfer of, receive control over, manufacture, acquire or seek to receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or their delivery vehicles. In this context, Canada remains very concerned by the nuclear test of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 25 May 2009. This ill-advised action undermines confidence in the commitment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to peace and security and contravenes the global norm against nuclear testing. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's provocative actions are alarming and run contrary to its stated desire to engage constructively with the community of nations. Canada calls upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to immediately resume cooperation with IAEA inspectors, to comply fully with Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) requiring the suspension of all activities related to nuclear testing and its ballistic missile programme, and to fulfil all commitments it made as part of previous Six-Party agreements. We urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return immediately to the Six-Party

Talks, which remain the best means to achieve a permanent, peaceful resolution of the Korean peninsula's long-standing security issues.

6. In a statement delivered on 4 February 2009, Canada's Foreign Minister urged the Islamic Republic of Iran to comply with the international obligations set out by the Security Council. On 10 February 2010, Canada's Prime Minister Harper further called on the Islamic Republic of Iran to end its defiance of the international community, suspend its enrichment activity and take immediate steps towards transparency and compliance by halting the construction of new enrichment sites and fully cooperating with IAEA. Canada also emphasizes that the Islamic Republic of Iran must also take steps to build confidence that its nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes, primarily by fully implementing the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and providing IAEA with the necessary information to draw a positive conclusion. Canada has fully implemented in Canadian law the requirements of the most recent Security Council sanctions resolution on the Islamic Republic of Iran (1803 (2008)), and encourages the Islamic Republic of Iran to accept the P5+1 offer to exchange its illegally enriched nuclear material for fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. Canada's national export control system is consistent with the lists of those multilateral nuclear export control mechanisms in which it participates. These measures serve to facilitate peaceful nuclear commerce and international cooperation while ensuring that non-proliferation policies are met. As part of our commitment to continuous improvement, Canada hosted an IAEA International Regulatory Review Service mission in June 2009. The review team has determined that Canada has a mature and well-established nuclear regulatory framework. Canada continues to cooperate actively with other like-minded States in a variety of international forums to develop new measures aimed at further strengthening the non-proliferation regime, particularly with regard to the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies associated with the production of special fissionable material suitable for nuclear weapons purposes, and the suspension of nuclear cooperation in cases of non-compliance with nuclear non-proliferation commitments.

Article III

7. Pursuant to article III, Canada has in place a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA. In support of IAEA efforts to strengthen safeguards, Canada concluded a protocol additional to its safeguards agreement, which entered into force on 8 September 2000. With both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in place, IAEA is in a position to draw an annual conclusion regarding the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for Canada as a whole. This broad conclusion, first achieved in 2005 and subsequently maintained on an annual basis, provides the highest level of confidence that Canada is in compliance with its peaceful use commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Furthermore, the attainment and maintenance of the broad conclusion has allowed IAEA to fundamentally change the way safeguards are undertaken in Canada, by implementing a State-level integrated safeguards approach. These developments are a direct result of Canada's strong support for the IAEA safeguards system and of the high level of cooperation between IAEA and Canada in the implementation of the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol. In addition, through the Canadian Safeguards Support Programme, Canada contributes to the

research and development of state-of-the-art safeguards equipment and techniques aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards. This effort resulted in a contribution of approximately Can$ 1.5 million over the 2009/10 fiscal year. At IAEA and at the General Assembly, Canada continues to urge States that have yet to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol to do so as soon as possible. Canada is of the view that a comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an additional protocol constitutes the safeguards standard required under article III.

8. Consistent with its obligation not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes unless the source or special fissionable material is subject to IAEA safeguards, and with decision 2, paragraph 12, of the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference, with the exception of India, Canada will only authorize nuclear cooperation involving proliferation-significant items with those non-nuclear-weapon States that have made an internationally legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that have accepted IAEA safeguards on the full scope of their nuclear activities. All of Canada's nuclear partners have accepted, through a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with Canada, a number of additional measures designed to ensure that nuclear items supplied by Canada do not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Canada maintains a national system for controlling the export of all items especially designed or prepared for nuclear use and certain nuclear-related dual-use items, including, with respect to the specific requirements of article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, source or special fissionable material and equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. It ensures that exports of nuclear and nuclear dual-use items are not authorized where there is found to be an unacceptable risk of diversion to a weapons of mass destruction programme or an unsafeguarded facility, or when an export would be otherwise contrary to Canada's non-proliferation policy and international commitments and obligations. Canada's export control legislation includes a catch-all provision.

Article IV

9. Canada strongly supports the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Canada maintains a robust nuclear power programme and believes that nuclear energy can make an important contribution to prosperity and sustainable development, while also addressing concerns about climate change. To this end, Canada has 27 nuclear cooperation agreements in force, covering 44 States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, both developed and developing, to provide a framework for the fullest possible exchange of nuclear and other material, equipment and technology. Since the 2005 Review Conference, Canada has held eight official bilateral consultations with nuclear cooperation agreement partner States, as well as formal administrative arrangement consultations with 14 nuclear cooperation agreement partner country authorities. Canada has been a strong supporter of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme and has often met or exceeded the rate of attainment for voluntary contributions to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund. Canada has also actively supported efforts to strengthen the Technical Cooperation Programme to make it more transparent and accountable in a results-based framework. The 2009 statement

by the Group of Eight Nuclear Safety and Security Group reaffirmed the commitment by Canada and a number of other States to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, and welcomed the entry into force of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

10. In view of the inherent relationship between the inalienable rights of States to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the obligations contained elsewhere in the Treaty, cooperation by Canada with other countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy takes fully into account the non-proliferation credentials of the recipient country. Canada is committed to working with other States and relevant international organizations on new arrangements for the supply of nuclear items, consistent with the balance of rights and obligations agreed to in the Treaty, in particular in articles II, III and IV. Canada welcomes efforts to develop new mechanisms to help assure reliable access to nuclear fuel, given the increased confidence such mechanisms could provide to those seeking to develop or expand nuclear power capabilities. With this in view, Canada welcomed the Russian Federation initiative to establish a reserve of low enriched uranium as a practical step forward and supported its approval by the IAEA Board of Governors. Canada also notes that many questions and concerns still exist about such initiatives and will assess each proposal on its individual merits.

11. Canada has also been involved in efforts to assist in the harmonized implementation of the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and has provided extrabudgetary funding to IAEA on three occasions to support technical meetings for review of the implementation of the Code, specifically the IAEA Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. This funding facilitates participation by delegates from developing countries. As one of the world's leading suppliers and exporters of radioactive sources, Canada has a strong interest in the establishment and maintenance of an effective, efficient and harmonized international regime for ensuring their safety and security, including measures to prevent their use in malicious or terrorist acts. As such, Canada has implemented an enhanced export and import control programme for risk-significant radioactive sources in accordance with the IAEA Code and the Guidance. Canadian implementation encompasses full export controls, notifications and establishment of bilateral arrangements with foreign regulatory counterparts for the harmonized implementation of the IAEA Guidance. Since the establishment of the enhanced import and export control programme, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission has interacted with 82 countries and issued 615 licences to export risk-significant radioactive sources.

Article V

12. The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference affirms that provisions of article V are to be interpreted in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Canada signed that Treaty on 24 September 1996, when it opened for signature, and deposited its instrument of ratification on 18 December 1998. Canada was the first State signatory to the Treaty to sign a facility agreement with the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization on 19 October 1998. Canada has played an active role in encouraging further signatures and ratification of the Treaty, with a view to achieving its universality. In September 2009, Canada joined the consensus among Treaty

ratifiers in support of the Final Declaration of the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held at United Nations Headquarters in New York. As a part of its Group of Eight presidency in 2010, Canada took a démarche to urge the Governments of all States that had yet to sign or ratify the Treaty to do so in advance of the 2010 Review Conference.

13. Canada co-sponsored the resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (resolution 64/69) at the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly. The resolution calls for the earliest entry into force of the Treaty and urges all States to maintain their moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions until entry into force is achieved. Canada places a priority on the establishment of the Treaty's verification system and, as such, is a leader among State signatories in contributing resources and expertise to the development of the international monitoring system. Canada hosts 15 international monitoring systems stations and one laboratory. As announced by Canada's Minister for Foreign Affairs in his address at the 2009 Conference on the entry into force of the Treaty, Canada was finalizing the certification of its final monitoring station that forms part of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty international monitoring system. Certification of this final station was achieved in November 2009.

Article VI

14. Canada continues to take very seriously the obligation of article VI and the commitments agreed upon in the 1995 Principles and Objectives and in the 13 practical steps at the 2000 Review Conference. These have been at the forefront of a number of activities and statements.

Steps 1 and 2

15. Canada's action in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the moratorium on nuclear testing is described above, under article V implementation.

Steps 3 and 4

16. Canada supported decision CD/1864 that was adopted by consensus in the Conference on Disarmament in May 2009, the first programme of work adopted in the Conference on Disarmament in over a decade. Canada attaches priority in the Conference on Disarmament to the start of negotiations on a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty. In the 2009 session of the First Committee of the General Assembly, Canada sponsored a resolution entitled "Treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices" that, inter alia, called for the Conference on Disarmament to begin fissile material cut-off treaty negotiations early in its 2010 session. This resolution was adopted by consensus.

Step 5

17. Canada emphasizes the importance of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability in the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons arsenals and facilities. At the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, Canada co-sponsored the resolution entitled "Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons" (resolution 64/47), which emphasized the importance of applying

irreversibility and verifiability, as well as increased transparency in the process of working towards nuclear disarmament.

Step 6

18. Canada reiterated its call on nuclear-weapon States to securely reduce and dismantle their nuclear-weapon arsenals in an irreversible and verifiable manner at the sixty-fourth session of the First Committee of the General Assembly. At that session, Canada voted in favour of resolutions 64/57, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments", and 64/47, entitled "Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons". Canada welcomes recent statements by several of the recognized nuclear-weapon States to work towards a step-by-step approach to reaching "global zero".

19. Canada supports the reduced salience of nuclear weapons and the significant reduction of NATO nuclear forces that has taken place since the end of the cold war. As a member of NATO, Canada continues to advocate that the Alliance play a positive role in advancing disarmament objectives through a continuous step-by-step approach in a manner that increases international peace and stability. Canada was one of the strongest and most vocal proponents of the NATO decision to endorse the 13 practical steps towards disarmament. The fact that NATO has reduced the number of weapons available for its substrategic forces in Europe by 90 per cent since 1991, and by more than 95 per cent since the height of the cold war is evidence of the Allies' commitment to disarmament.

Step 7

20. Canada firmly supports the nuclear disarmament talks that have been held between the United States and the Russian Federation. We welcomed the Joint Understanding issued by United States President Obama and Russian President Medvedev at their summit in July 2009, in which they outlined their goals for a successor agreement to START I. As noted above, Canada co-sponsored resolution 64/47, "Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", at the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, which encouraged the Russian Federation and the United States to implement fully the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, which would serve as a step for further nuclear disarmament, and to undertake nuclear arms reductions beyond those provided for by the Treaty. It also welcomed the progress made by nuclear-weapon States, including the Russian Federation and the United States, on nuclear arms reductions to date.

Step 8

21. Canada has encouraged the Russian Federation and the United States to implement the Trilateral Initiative by submitting surplus stocks of fissile material to IAEA control.

Step 9

22. Canada's support for further reductions of nuclear weapons as an important step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons was expressed by our vote in favour of the resolution entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapons-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments" (resolution

64/57) at the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly. Canada also supports measures to reduce the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security, as called for in the resolution entitled "Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons" (resolution 64/47).

23. In 2002, Canada pledged Can$ 1 billion over 10 years to the Group of Eight-led Global Partnership. To date, through the DFAIT's Global Partnership Programme, Canada has spent more than Can$ 530 million to address these risks through concrete projects including more than Can$ 122 million in nuclear security and is scheduled to meet its commitment by 2012. Through the Global Partnership Programme, Canada has provided more than Can$ 61 million towards critical security upgrades at 10 nuclear facilities in the Russian Federation, and is also developing joint nuclear security projects with the United States in third countries beyond the former Soviet Union. The Global Partnership Programme has also funded multiple projects to secure highly radioactive sources. Canada is the third largest State donor to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, established to strengthen nuclear and radiological security worldwide. On 28 March 2009, Foreign Minister Cannon announced that Canada would contribute a further Can$ 4 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund in order to complement the nuclear security improvements made previously. Working with the United States Department of Energy, Canada contributed to enhancing border security in order to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. Canada also cooperated with the United States Department of Energy to recover and secure vulnerable, highly radioactive sources powering navigational devices, such as lighthouses. Canada has fully dismantled 13 decommissioned nuclear submarines and defuelled 30 reactors in the north-west region of the Russian Federation. In the far eastern region of the Russian Federation, Canada started projects for the safe transport of spent nuclear fuel from the region and has defuelled four reactors. Canada has contributed to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership to manage safely and securely spent fuel (including highly enriched uranium) from submarines in the northern region of the Russian Federation. As a member of the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow and the Science and Technology Center in the Ukraine, Canada has funded over 180 individual research projects engaging over 2,600 former weapons scientists in civilian employment through various research projects and other programmes and activities, including in the area of nuclear and radiological security.

Step 10

24. Through the Global Partnership Programme, Canada is contributing to the elimination and disposition of fissile material, ensuring that it cannot be acquired by terrorists or countries of proliferation concern. Canada has also pledged funds towards the plutonium disposition programme of the Russian Federation, which will convert 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium into forms not usable for weapons. In addition, Canada contributed to a United States-led project to shut down the last Russian weapons-grade plutonium producing reactor in Zheleznogorsk. The United States views nuclear terrorism as the most immediate threat to global security, and President Obama has stated his goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within four years. Consonant with this, President Obama is hosting the first Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010, inviting 44 Heads of State and

three international organizations to strengthen domestic and international commitments to enhance nuclear security and combat the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. Canada strongly supports the Nuclear Security Summit and welcomes the United States goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world over the next four years. Through the Group of Eight Global Partnership, Canada will continue to work with the United States in developing joint nuclear security projects around the world to address those risks.

Step 11

25. In the interests of general and complete disarmament, Canada is a State party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (for which Canada's Ambassador Marius Grinius chaired the 2009 meetings), the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the Treaty on Open Skies, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Outer Space Treaty. During the fiscal year 2009-2010, Canada continued to support mine action in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and South America. Canada has signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions and is working on its early ratification.

Step 12

26. At the 2005 Review Conference, Canada submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.39) on the concept of "permanence with accountability" for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which among other proposals, supported the practice of submitting annual reports on treaty implementation prior to such meetings. This followed up a number of previous papers submitted by Canada at earlier Preparatory Committee meetings on the topic. Canada commends States for the information they have provided to date but notes that the number of reports by State parties continues to decline with only five reports submitted to the 2009 Preparatory Committee. Canada continues to encourage States to submit information about their efforts and activities as official reports prior to Preparatory Committee meetings as well as Review Conferences.

Step 13

27. In early 2005, Canada submitted a major study on weapons of mass destruction verification and compliance to the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, which has been published as part of the Commission's series of papers and studies and is available at http://www.wmdcommission.org. Canada also tabled a resolution entitled "Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification" (resolution 62/21) at the sixty-second session of the General Assembly, which was adopted by consensus. Canada will again table a resolution on verification at the sixty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

Article VII

28. Canada continues to underline the need to preserve and respect the negative security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. While not itself a member of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, Canada welcomes and encourages progress to develop

and implement nuclear-weapon-free zone agreements consistent with international law and internationally agreed criteria. At the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, Canada supported resolutions calling for the establishment or consolidation of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Article VIII

29. The indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and accompanying decisions adopted in 1995 enshrined the concept of permanence with accountability. In accordance with the commitments arising from the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, Canada delivered at the 2005 Review Conference its fourth report on its implementation of the Treaty, followed by reports at the 2007, 2008 and 2009 preparatory committees. Canada also reported on the steps taken to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

30. Canada has been active in promoting measures to reinforce the authority and integrity of the Treaty and ensure the implementation of its obligations. At the 2005 Review Conference, Canada presented a working paper (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.39) with recommendations for a revamped Non-Proliferation Treaty process, making suggestions on meeting frequency and structure (including possibility for extraordinary meetings), reporting, the participation of civil society and the creation of a standing bureau. This was followed up with another working paper submitted at the 2007 Preparatory Committee. Canada reaffirmed and elaborated upon these proposals in a working paper submitted at the 2009 Preparatory Committee session on the same subject. Canada, working with a group of States in Geneva, has further refined these proposals and will advocate for a series of decisions to further strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process at the 2010 Review Conference.

Article IX

31. Canada has consistently worked for the universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. At the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, Canada co-sponsored the resolution entitled "Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons" (resolution 64/47), which reaffirms the importance of the universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and calls upon States not party to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States without delay and without conditions. Canada views its position in this regard as consistent with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) (as well as resolutions 1673 (2006) and 1810 (2008)) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which calls on all States to promote the universal adoption and full implementation of multilateral treaties, the aims of which are to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

Article X

32. Canada has continued to coordinate a core group of countries at the IAEA General Conference responsible for a resolution on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. As in past years, since 2006 the Canadian-led core group has annually facilitated the adoption by consensus of a resolution to promote the

resumption of that country's obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the implementation of its comprehensive safeguards agreement.

33. Canada welcomed the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, adopted without a vote in 1995. Negative security assurances provided in 1995 by the five nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) furnished part of the basis for this indefinite extension, as paragraph 8 of the "principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament".

Article XI

34. Not applicable.

Annex

"Transparency and accountability: NPT reporting 2002-2009" by Project Ploughshares

Summary[1]

1. The indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995 was agreed in the context of a collective commitment by States parties to strengthening the Treaty's review process and, in particular, with a heightened sense of the need for mutual accountability in the implementation and furtherance of the aims of the Treaty. In 2000, States agreed (in step 12 of the 13 practical steps) that such accountability would be advanced by a more formalized approach to reporting by each State party to its Treaty partners, providing regular information on the actions taken and policies followed to meet the requirements of the Treaty and to implement additional measures agreed in the review process.

2. States parties to NPT have now had seven specific occasions to submit the "regular reports" that were agreed in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. Some 48 States have used at least one of those opportunities and have together submitted 123 reports. Only four have reported to each Preparatory Committee and Review Conference since 2000.

3. This summary provides an overview of the paper entitled "Transparency and accountability: NPT reporting 2002-2009", which compiles the reporting to date, provides background to the reporting commitment, reviews the continuing discussion of the appropriate scope and format of reports, broadly surveys the content of reports submitted and recommends ways in which reporting can be strengthened and thus better meet the principle of accountability that was emphasized as part of the 1995 indefinite extension of the Treaty.

4. As shown in figure 1, just over one quarter of the 189 States parties to NPT have reported at least once since 2000, and 1 in 6 submitted reports to the 2005 Review Conference. At the 2007 Preparatory Committee, 1 in 20 reported. But in 2009, only five reported — less than 1 in 30.

Figure 1

48	States have submitted at least one report
11	States reported in 2002
28	States reported in 2003 (20 for the first time)
29	States reported in 2004 (8 for the first time)
35	States reported in 2005 (9 for the first time)
9	States reported in 2007 (none for the first time)
7	States reported in 2008 (none for the first time)
5	States reported in 2009 (none for the first time)

[1] The full document can be accessed at: http://www.ploughshares.ca/abolish/NPTReporting.html.

4 States have submitted reports all seven years

16 States have submitted only once

4 States have reported to every Preparatory Committee and Review Conference since 2000

5. It is noteworthy that a relatively high proportion, almost two thirds, of the 44 States in annex 2 of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty have reported at some point since 2000 (see figure 2, which identifies reporting by States within various groupings). Annex 2 lists States with some nuclear technology capability, all of which must ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty before it can enter into force, and three of which (India, Israel and Pakistan) are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Only two nuclear-weapon States are included among the 48 States reporting. The Russian Federation and China each submitted formal reports in 2005. The three non-NPT States in possession of nuclear weapons are not under any formal reporting requirement because they are not NPT signatories. All of the nuclear-weapon States that are party to NPT have reported informally through a variety of statements and background materials. For the most part, however, the nuclear-weapon States have chosen not to provide formal reports, in defiance of the promise made when they agreed to the 2000 reporting provision.

Figure 2

6 **New Agenda Coalition** States reported:
Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden
(*Egypt, also a member, has not reported*)

12 **Non-Aligned Movement** States reported:
Cuba, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Malaysia, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand
(*Non-Aligned Movement membership is now at 118, 106 of which have not reported*)

19 **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** States reported:
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey
(*of the 26 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the following seven did not report: Denmark, Estonia, France, Iceland, Slovenia, United Kingdom, United States*)

19 **European Union** States reported:
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden
(*the following European Union States did not report: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, France, Malta, Slovenia, United Kingdom*)

30 **Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty annex 2** States reported:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine
(of the 44 annex 2 States, 3 — India, Israel and Pakistan — are not signatories to NPT, and 11 others that are parties to NPT have not reported — Algeria, Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, France, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam)

2 **nuclear-weapon** States formally reported:
Russian Federation, China
(France, United Kingdom, United States have not submitted formal reports)

6. A decline in attention to reporting is reflected in the fact that 2007 was the first year since the 2000 agreement on reporting in which no new States were added to the list of reporting States. In other words, the first year in which no State submitted a report for the first time. This trend continued and no new States reported in 2008 or 2009. Indeed, 2009 saw the lowest level of reporting since the obligation to report was undertaken, when only five States submitted a report. A decline from the level of reporting to the 2005 Review Conference was perhaps to be expected, but a 75 per cent drop should be taken as a worrying sign about the level of commitment to transparency and accountability. To date the greatest increase in levels of reporting occurred in 2003, when 20 States submitted reports for the first time. The highest level of reporting occurred at the 2005 Review Conference, when 34 States reported, 11 for the first time. Of the 48 States that have submitted a report to date, 34 have reported more than once, and of these, only Australia, Canada, Japan and New Zealand have reported at all meetings of the review process since 2000.

7. There is not yet wide agreement on the format of reporting. There are many variations, but they can be divided into three basic categories, as shown in figure 3. The "general" format refers to reports that tend to focus on article VI issues and describe broadly the reporting State's activities in support of disarmament. The "articles" format refers to submissions that report on activities related to each article of the Treaty, generally on the grounds that the Treaty is an integrated whole and that all its articles are relevant to the implementation of nuclear disarmament. The "13 steps" approach reports on each element of the widely agreed disarmament agenda outlined in the 2000 Review Conference 13 practical steps.

8. Some States, notably Canada and New Zealand, have reported in two formats: article-by-article and the 13 steps. Most States still prefer the general format of reporting on their disarmament activities, responding to the particular language of the 2000 Final Document, entitling their reports "Implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament". Some States refer simply to reporting on the implementation of article VI, without mentioning the 1995 Decision. Others use the title, "Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", broadening the reporting mandate to the entire Treaty.

9. The charts in figure 3 examine the breakdown of the various reporting formats since 2002: the article-by-article (articles) and 13 steps formats, as well as the general narrative of activities relevant to article VI reports. In the period from 2003

to 2009, New Zealand is counted twice, while Canada is counted twice in the period from 2007 to 2009, due to the fact that these States used two formats in the years listed. The general narrative format consistent with the 1995 Principles and Objectives and article VI continues to be the most widely used, although States are increasingly exploring other formats.

Figure 3

Report formats 2002
Total: 10



Report formats 2003
Total: 29



Report formats 2004
Total: 30

Report formats 2005
Total: 36



Report formats 2007
Total: 11

Report formats 2008
Total: 9



Report formats 2009
Total: 7

10. The full report, which can be accessed at http://www.ploughshares.ca/abolish/NPTReporting.html, includes a detailed table that summarizes the contents of the formal reports that have been submitted until 2009, as well as a section that documents the informal reports of nuclear-weapon States.

11. The present annex was authored by Ernie Regehr, Senior Policy Adviser and Cesar Jaramillo, Programme Associate, of Project Ploughshares, and contains a range of information that may be of interest to States parties. The views and positions expressed in the paper are solely those of the authors: the paper is contributed purely to stimulate informal discussion among States parties in preparation for the Review Conference.

NPT/CONF.2010/10

2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

19 March 2010

Original: English

New York, 3-28 May 2010

Implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

Report submitted by Sweden

Introduction

1. As stated in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in the section entitled "Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs", in paragraph 15, subparagraph 12, the Conference agreed on "regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996". Sweden would hereby like to submit its report to the 2010 Review Conference.

2. Since the first session of the Preparatory Committee in 2007, Sweden has actively participated in the work on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. This has been done, for example, through the European Union, together with the States in the New Agenda Coalition, with the States in the Vienna Group of 10 and with other like-minded States. Disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a cornerstone of Swedish foreign policy, and Sweden is a staunch supporter of efforts aimed at advancing progress in this field.

3. In the annual statement of Government policy in the parliamentary debate on foreign affairs, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Carl Bildt, stated on 17 February 2010 that "Our goal remains a world without nuclear weapons".

4. In an address given at the Global Zero summit on 2 February 2010, Foreign Minister Bildt stated, inter alia, that the international community had arrived at a critical point, where it could either take decisive steps forward in further reducing nuclear arsenals and preventing a further spread of nuclear weapons, eventually taking the world closer to the goal of a world free of those weapons, or face the very serious risk of the non-proliferation regime eroding and paving the way for a development that would significantly increase the risk of those weapons being used, with catastrophic and unforeseeable effects.

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5. An agreement on further limits on strategic arms should be followed by talks aimed at reductions also in substrategic nuclear weapons. Pending the eventual elimination of the substrategic weapons, it would make sense for the remaining weapons to be withdrawn to central storage facilities. Strategic postures and military doctrines should make clear that the sole purpose of the remaining nuclear weapons should be strategic deterrence, and that under no circumstances would nuclear-armed States contemplate their first use. The United States of America and the Russian Federation should be prepared to take the lead in issuing such declarations. The importance of ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was also stressed.

6. In a op-ed article in the *International Herald Tribune* on 2 February 2010, Foreign Minister Bildt, together with the Foreign Minister of Poland, Radek Sikorski, stated that they were looking forward to welcoming an agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation on further reductions of strategic nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, they called for early progress on steep reductions in substrategic nuclear weapons. They called on the leaders of the United States and the Russian Federation to commit themselves to early measures to greatly reduce substrategic nuclear weapons in Europe as steps towards the total elimination of these types of weapons.

7. At the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, Sweden, together with the other States in the New Agenda Coalition, sponsored resolution 64/57, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments". In that resolution, the Assembly noted with satisfaction the renewed interest in nuclear disarmament on the part of international leaders expressed, inter alia, during the Security Council summit on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament held on 24 September 2009, reaffirmed that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing processes requiring urgent irreversible progress on both fronts, and recalled the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament, in accordance with commitments made under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The resolution was supported by more than 169 countries, demonstrating broad support among regions for the nuclear disarmament pillar of the Treaty.

8. At the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, Sweden supported a number of resolutions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, such as the resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (64/26), a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (64/29), a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas (64/44), renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons (64/47), the follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons* (64/55), towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments (64/57), the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (64/66) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (64/69).

9. Sweden is also committed to the effective implementation of the European Union strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the European Union in December 2003.

Building further on this strategy, the Heads of State and Government of the European Union agreed in December 2008 on an action plan against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Furthermore, in December 2008 the Heads of State and Government of the European Union endorsed a declaration on international security, with a focus on issues related to disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the prevention of terrorism.

NPT/CONF.2005/46

Implementation of the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament included in the Final Document adopted by consensus at the 2000 Review Conference

10. Step 1: The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

11. Sweden ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on 2 December 1998. Sweden has worked for the early entry into force of the Treaty bilaterally and through the European Union. Sweden has continuously supported the work of the Provisional Technical Secretariat in Vienna and its efforts to establish the international monitoring system for the verification of the Treaty. Sweden has promoted signatures and ratifications of the Treaty through démarches made by the European Union to a number of States. Sweden supported General Assembly resolution 64/69, entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty", in which the Assembly called for measures to enable the Treaty to enter into force. Sweden supports the article XIV conferences as important instruments contributing to the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the holding of a seventh article XIV conference. Sweden supported the adoption at the sixth article XIV conference in 2009 of the Final Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

12. Step 2: A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of that Treaty.

13. Sweden has continuously supported the upholding of a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions by the nuclear-weapon States pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

14. Step 3: The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

15. Sweden welcomes the adoption of the programme of work by the Conference on Disarmament in 2009, but regrets that the Conference has not been able to agree

on a programme of work in 2010, and that, as a consequence, negotiations have unfortunately not yet commenced on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. Sweden believes that it is of paramount importance that the members of the Conference on Disarmament agree on a new programme of work as soon as possible. Sweden supported General Assembly resolution 64/29 on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Within the European Union and together with the other States in the New Agenda Coalition, Sweden calls for the declaration, and the upholding, of existing moratoriums on the production of fissile material for military purposes pending the conclusion of a legally binding treaty.

16. Step 4: The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work that includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

17. Sweden supports the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament. Sweden has proposed that discussions on nuclear disarmament take as their point of departure security policy doctrines and information exchange on current nuclear weapons capabilities and nuclear disarmament measures.

18. Step 5: The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

19. Irreversibility is a fundamental principle for nuclear disarmament. Only irreversible reductions can assure that redeployment of nuclear weapons does not occur. Sweden continues to stress that the principle of irreversibility should be applicable to all disarmament and arms control measures, unilateral, bilateral or multilateral.

20. Step 6: An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI.

21. Sweden continues to emphasize the importance of States living up to their commitments regarding the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. The unequivocal undertaking to which the nuclear-weapon States committed themselves at the 2000 Review Conference is yet to be fulfilled.

22. Step 7: The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

23. Sweden welcomes the joint understanding by the President of the Russian Federation and the President of the United States in July 2009, reaffirming their commitment to further reductions and limitations of their nations' strategic offensive arms and to concluding at an early date a new, legally binding, post-START agreement. At the same time, Sweden calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States to make steep reductions in their substrategic nuclear weapons, and

also to address non-deployed warheads, to make reductions irreversible, transparent and verifiable.

24. Step 8: The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

25. Step 9: Steps by all nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability and based on the principle of undiminished security for all; further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their arsenals unilaterally; increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament; the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process; concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems; a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk of these weapons ever being used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; the engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

26. Sweden fully supports these steps and continues to promote advancements in their implementation. In particular, Sweden continues to press for progress regarding reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Sweden believes that it is essential that non-strategic nuclear weapons be included in international arms control and disarmament efforts. Non-strategic weapons are a global concern. Sweden will continue to work on this issue at the 2010 Review Conference. Sweden also continues to stress the importance of a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies and increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI. At the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference, Sweden, together with the other States in the New Agenda Coalition, submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.15) expressing concern about the emergence in recent years of new military doctrines emphasizing the importance of nuclear weapons, not only to defence but also to the offensive capabilities of States. At the second session, the New Agenda Coalition presented a working paper on transparency and confidence-building (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.26).

27. Furthermore, steps to increase transparency regarding nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI serve as a confidence-building measure and should be strongly supported. The principle of transparency should be applicable to all disarmament and arms control efforts, unilateral, bilateral or multilateral. It is also of particular importance that nuclear-weapon States diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies, do not increase the number or types of nuclear weapons deployed and do not develop new types of nuclear weapons or rationalizations for their use.

28. Step 10: Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and

arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

29. Sweden encourages those nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so to conclude such arrangements.

30. Step 11: Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

31. Sweden takes an active part in the work on disarmament of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, as well as conventional weapons. Reference is made here to the relevant treaties and instruments that deal with these types of weapons.

32. Step 12: Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

33. Sweden believes that reports on the implementation of the article and paragraph mentioned above enhance transparency and accountability and build confidence, and should therefore be encouraged.

34. Step 13: The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

35. Sweden continues to give strong support to IAEA and to a system of strengthened safeguards. The Additional Protocol to comprehensive safeguards agreements represents the verification standard for Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards. Sweden therefore continues to urge all States to conclude and bring into force Additional Protocols. Such a Protocol entered into force for Sweden, together with other European Union member States and Euratom, on 30 April 2004. Sweden is of the view that the Review Conference should take the decision that the Additional Protocol, together with a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, represents the verification standard under article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.